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Difference between revisions of "Predicativity"

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A special way of forming concepts, characterized by the absence of a  "vicious circle"  in the definitions: the object to be defined should not participate in its own definition. If the language in which the definitions are stated is formalized, then predicativity means, as a rule, that the defining formula should not contain a bound variable whose domain of variation includes the object to be defined.
 
A special way of forming concepts, characterized by the absence of a  "vicious circle"  in the definitions: the object to be defined should not participate in its own definition. If the language in which the definitions are stated is formalized, then predicativity means, as a rule, that the defining formula should not contain a bound variable whose domain of variation includes the object to be defined.
  
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====Comments====
 
====Comments====
For an enriched set theory that does admit circularity see [[#References|[a1]]]; for an account of  "liarthe liar"  based on this cf. [[#References|[a2]]].
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For an enriched set theory that does admit circularity see [[#References|[a1]]]; for an account of  "the liar"  based on this cf. [[#References|[a2]]].
  
 
====References====
 
====References====
 
<table><TR><TD valign="top">[a1]</TD> <TD valign="top">  P. Aczel,  "Non well-founded sets" , Centre Study of Language and Inform., Stanford Univ.  (1987)</TD></TR><TR><TD valign="top">[a2]</TD> <TD valign="top">  J. Barwise,  J. Etchemendy,  "The liar. An essay on truth and circularity" , Oxford Univ. Press  (1987)</TD></TR></table>
 
<table><TR><TD valign="top">[a1]</TD> <TD valign="top">  P. Aczel,  "Non well-founded sets" , Centre Study of Language and Inform., Stanford Univ.  (1987)</TD></TR><TR><TD valign="top">[a2]</TD> <TD valign="top">  J. Barwise,  J. Etchemendy,  "The liar. An essay on truth and circularity" , Oxford Univ. Press  (1987)</TD></TR></table>

Latest revision as of 16:36, 1 May 2014

A special way of forming concepts, characterized by the absence of a "vicious circle" in the definitions: the object to be defined should not participate in its own definition. If the language in which the definitions are stated is formalized, then predicativity means, as a rule, that the defining formula should not contain a bound variable whose domain of variation includes the object to be defined.

A non-predicative definition, on the other hand, is distinguished by the presence of a "vicious circle" within it. The phenomenon of non-predicativity can also be encountered in certain reasoning wherein the process of substantiating a certain part of the reasoning under consideration is itself considered as an object of reasoning. It is exactly the use of this kind of reasoning that is a ground for the appearance of semantic antinomies (cf. Antinomy). A typical example is the contradiction in the liar's paradox: If someone states "I am lying" , then this statement can be neither true nor false.


Comments

For an enriched set theory that does admit circularity see [a1]; for an account of "the liar" based on this cf. [a2].

References

[a1] P. Aczel, "Non well-founded sets" , Centre Study of Language and Inform., Stanford Univ. (1987)
[a2] J. Barwise, J. Etchemendy, "The liar. An essay on truth and circularity" , Oxford Univ. Press (1987)
How to Cite This Entry:
Predicativity. Encyclopedia of Mathematics. URL: http://encyclopediaofmath.org/index.php?title=Predicativity&oldid=32107
This article was adapted from an original article by V.N. GrishinA.G. Dragalin (originator), which appeared in Encyclopedia of Mathematics - ISBN 1402006098. See original article