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| − | ==Looking back at these efforts==
| + | Each statement of a syllogism is one of 4 types, as follows: |
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| − | As stated at the outset, this article is intended to be a brief history of the arithmetization program. It seeks to set forth the achievements of mathematicians working in that program that have led to what is important in mathematics today. The history presented has been dubbed "the standard account" by some, for the simple reason that it is not the only account. In such history articles, it is usual to include alternate views of events within the main narrative. That practice is not adhered to in this article. Instead, summaries of those alternate views are gathered here, at the end of the article, with the intention of providing a platform for inserting additional entries and, if appropriate, for linking to additional articles.
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| − | ===Concurrent "corrections" to arithmetization===
| + | ! Type !! Statement !! Alternative |
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| − | One modern commentator, forthright in his support of the arithmetization program, generally, and of the contribution of his countryman Bolzano, in particular, nevertheless advances somewhat of a caveat in the form of the following contrast:<ref>Jarník et. al. p. 33</ref>
| + | | style="text-align: center;" | '''A''' || '''All''' $A$ '''are''' $B$ || |
| − | * it was essential to move analysis off of its intuitive/geometric base onto a rigourous/arithmetic base
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| − | * mathematics continued to develop during the arithmetization period, somewhat as a "correction" to it
| + | | style="text-align: center;" | '''I''' || '''Some''' $A$ '''are''' $B$ || |
| − | In his own words:
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| − | :[By] the first half of the nineteenth century the building of mathematical analysis was raised to such a height that continuing its construction without fortifying its foundations was unthinkable. This brought a period of great revision of the foundations of analysis...; the development of the other branches of mathematics continued, of course, simultaneously and in mutual interaction. | + | | style="text-align: center;" | '''E''' || '''No''' $A$ '''are''' $B$ || (= '''All''' $A$ '''are not''' $B$) |
| − | :It seems evident that ... the revision could not follow other direction than that of consequential arithmetization of analysis.... [Yet,] this arithmetization ... was later corrected by the modern development of mathematics; after all, even in the period mentioned the dialectics of this process can be observed: so, for example, B. Riemann who on the one hand contributed considerably to the arithmetization of analysis by his theory of integral, was on the other hand the ingenious builder of the geometric theory of analytic functions.
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| − | | + | | style="text-align: center;" | '''O''' || '''Not All''' $A$ '''are''' $B$ || (= '''Some''' $A$ '''are not''' $B$) |
| − | ===A role for intuition in mathematics===
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| − | What today are commonplace notions in undergraduate mathematics were anything but commonplace among practicing mathematicians even a quarter century after the 1872 achievements of Cantor, Dedekind, and Weierstrass. In 1899, addressing the American Mathematical Society, James Pierpont spoke to show these two things:<ref>Pierpont, p. 394</ref>
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| − | # why arithmetical methods form the only sure foundation in analysis at present known
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| − | # why arguments based on intuition cannot be considered final in analysis
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| − | In a later, printed version of his address, Pierpont prefaced his words with the following:<ref>Pierpont, p. 395</ref>
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| − | :We are all of us aware of a movement among us which Klein has so felicitously styled the arithmetization of mathematics. Few of us have much real sympathy with it, if indeed we understand it. It seems a useless waste of time to prove by laborious $\varepsilon$ and $\delta$ methods what the old methods prove so satisfactorily in a few words. Indeed many of the things which exercise the mind of one whose eyes have been opened in the school of Weierstrass seem mere fads to the outsider. As well try to prove that two and two make four!
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| − | The term "arithmetization of mathematics," which Pierpont here ascribed to Klein, has also been credited to Kronecker -- perhaps to others as well? In any case, Pierpont ended his 1899 address with this paean to the labours of Weierstrass and others:<ref>Pierpont, p. 406</ref>
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| − | :The mathematician of to-day, trained in the school of Weierstrass, is fond of speaking of his science as ''die absolut klare Wissenschaft.'' Any attempts to drag in metaphysical speculations are resented with indignant energy. With almost painful emotions he looks back at the sorry mixture of metaphysics and mathematics which was so common in the last century and at the beginning of this. The analysis of to-day is indeed a transparent science. Built up on the simple notion of number, its truths are the most solidly established in the whole range of human knowledge.
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| − | Today, more than 100 years after Pierpont's address, intuition is present in mathematics in at least two, quite different, respects:
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| − | # as an accompaniment to the reintroduction of infinitesimals by non-standard analysis
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| − | # as an essential part of what is involved in mature, high-level mathematical thinking
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| − | ====Intuition in mathematical theory==== | |
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| − | According to the "standard account," the arithmetization program excised intuition from the foundations of mathematics. With the development (or, as it has alternatively been put, the "discovery") of non-standard analysis, intuition was restored to legitimacy in the foundations of mathematics. Robinson maintained that results achieved using nonstandard analysis could not have been achieved "just as well" by standard methods and that translation of non-standard results into standard terms "usually complicated matters considerably." He explained the reason for this difficulty as follows:<ref>Robinson (1965) cited in Dauben, p. 184</ref>
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| − | : Our approach has a certain natural appeal, as shown by the fact that it was preceded in history by a long line of attempts to introduce infinitely small and infinitely large numbers into Analysis.
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| − | The "natural appeal" to which Robinson refered is grounded in two factors:<ref>Dauben, p. 184</ref>
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| − | # nonstandard analysis is often simpler and more intuitive in a very direct, immediate way than standard approaches
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| − | # the concept of infinitesimals had always seemed natural and intuitively preferable to more convoluted and less intuitive sorts of rigor.
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| − | These "natural advantages" of using infinitesimals could now be exploited, now that nonstandard analysis had shown that their use was "safe for consumption" in mathematics!
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| − | ====Intuition in mathematical thinking====
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| − | In a very different sense, intuition is present in mathematical thinking at the highest levels, quite apart from and irrespective of the nature of foundations theory. In the remarks quoted above, Pierpont noted what may seem to be a very uncontroversial result among several that are said to have proceeded from the arithmetization program, namely, the replacement of "arguments based on intuition" with "arithmetic methods" as the foundation of analysis. Even so, an objection has been raised in the form of a suggestion that an untoward fixation on "rigourous formalism" can lead to a loss of the mathematical intuition that is essential to working at a mature level:<ref>Tao, "There's more to math...."</ref>
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| − | :The point of rigour is ''not'' to destroy all intuition; instead, it should be used to destroy ''bad'' intuition while clarifying and elevating ''good'' intuition. It is only with a combination of both rigorous formalism and good intuition that one can tackle complex mathematical problems; one needs the former to correctly deal with the fine details, and the latter to correctly deal with the big picture. . . . So once you are fully comfortable with rigorous mathematical thinking, you should revisit your intuitions on the subject and use your new thinking skills to test and refine these intuitions rather than discard them. . . .
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| − | :The ideal state to reach is when every heuristic argument naturally suggests its rigorous counterpart, and vice versa.
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| − | ===A place for infinitesimals in mathematics===
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| − | The "standard account" asserts that arithmetization "banished" infinitesimals from mathematics. Certainly, the elimination of infinitesimals was considered an important reason for pursuing the arithmetization program. Here, very briefly, is some background:<ref>Davis, 1. Introduction</ref>
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| − | :For many centuries, early mathematicians and physicists would solve problems by considering infinitesimally small pieces of a shape, or movement along a path by an infinitesimal amount.... In particular, the construction of calculus was first motivated by this intuitive notion of infinitesimal change.... Although intuitively clear, infinitesimals were ultimately rejected as mathematically unsound, and were replaced with the common $\varepsilon, \delta$ method of computing limits and derivatives.
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| − | Two comments are relevant. First, the work on non-Archimedean systems actually continued unabated both during and after the period of arithmetization, as documented by P. Ehrlich.<ref>Arithmetization, Tensegrity</ref>
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| − | Second, in 1960 came a very significant "correction" to arithmetization, namely, the development of non-standard analysis:<ref>Bogomolny, "What is Calculus?"</ref>
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| − | : Weierstrass' definition of limit appeared to finally nail the coffin of the departed quantities and led to a complete abandonment of the original idea of infinitesimals. However, in the 1960s the ghosts have been resurrected by Abraham Robinson and placed on the sound foundation of the non-standard analysis thus vindicating the intuition of [Newton and Leibniz,] the founding fathers.
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| − | Here is Robinson's definition of limit:
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| − | :$\displaystyle \lim_{x \to a} f(x) = L$, if and only if $f(x)$ is infinitely close to $L$ whenever $x ≠ a$ is infinitely close to $a$.
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| − | Robinson's goal for non-standard analysis was to create a system more intuitively appealing, while retaining all of the rigour of standard analysis. He did this by (rigourously) extending the field of reals is (rigorously) to include infinitesimal numbers and infinite numbers. The new, extended field is called the field of hyperreal numbers.<ref>Davis, p. 1</ref>
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| − | The effect (in some quarters) of Robinson's work in non-standard analysis was to usher in "a rehabilitation of the use of infinitesimals in mathematics" and to show, as Robinson himself proposed, that (at least some) of the infinitesimal methods used by the founders of calculus to be "correct and consistent."<ref>Kvasz The comments in this article are based on an abstract, provided by conference organizers, that described the address Kvasz would be giving. The text of the address itself was not provided.</ref>
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| − | ===Arithmetization and rigour=== | |
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| − | The "standard account" of the arithmetization program claims for it an increase in rigour, both in mathematical thinking and in mathematical definitions and proofs. Some (Dauben, Katz et. al.) working with the new non-standard methods challenged this claim.
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| − | Robinson himself, in his own historical writing, rejected the claim that increased rigour resulted from of the success of Cauchy-Weierstrassian epsilontics over infinitesimals. Certain one of his most important achievements in nonstandard analysis was the conclusive demonstration that such a claim is mere historicism.<ref>Dauben, p. 188</ref>
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| − | ===Set theoretic foundations===
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| − | The following contrast highlights a modern issue in our understanding of the arithmetization program:
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| − | * to the mathematicians who developed it, the arithmetization program signified efforts to develop a foundation for analysis, i.e. the calculus, in terms of the natural numbers
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| − | * after the development of naive set theory by Cantor, the arithmatization program came to signify the set-theoretic definition of function and the set-theoretic construction of the real line
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| − | There were several important consequences of this shift in meaning and intent of the arithmetization program, some of which were and remain contentious.<ref>Arithmetization, Tensegrity wikispace</ref>
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| − | Kronecker and other ''intuitionists'' rejected such efforts to extend the arithmetization program by defining the natural numbers using set theoretic concepts, arguing instead as follows:<ref>Ueno p. 73</ref>
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| − | * all the definitions appearing in the field of analysis can be reduced to the whole numbers and their properties
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| − | * the whole domain of this branch of mathematics can be explained basically from arithmetic
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| − | Kronecker's view was that mathematics "should be constructed rigidly on the basis of intuition of natural numbers."<ref>Ueno p. 71 As Ueno puts it, "Kronecker did not define numbers, [insisting that] the ability of counting is innate for human beings, and numbers are obtained as a result of the act of counting." p. 74</ref>
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| − | ===Consequences for teaching===
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| − | There is little dispute that arithmetization brought about a shift in emphasis from geometric to algebraic reasoning. Certainly this shift was considered an important reason for pursuing arithmetization. What is not widely appreciated is that an important consequence of this shift was a change in the way mathematics was subsequently taught.<ref>Arithmetization, Tensegrity</ref>
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| − | The development of non-standard analysis and the consequent return of infinitesimals to mathematics has given rise to the possibility of a further shift in the way mathematics is taught. The year 1971 saw the publication of Jerome Keisler's textbook, ''Elementary Calculus: An Approach Using Infinitesimals''. This text used nonstandard analysis to explain, in an introductory course, the basic ideas of calculus. In 1973-74, a study was done to determine the pragmatic value of using this textbook in teaching calculus. The study examined this pedagogical claim:<ref>Sullivan, p. 371 cited in Dauben, p. 190</ref>
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| − | : from this nonstandard approach, the definitions of the basic concepts [of the calculus] become simpler and the arguments more intuitive.
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| − | The results of the study, both as measured by a calculus test given to the students and by the comments of the instructors, are remarkable in their support of the heuristic value of using nonstandard analysis in the classroom.<ref>Dauben, pp. 190-1</ref>
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| − | It is worth looking at the single question in the test that brought out the greatest difference between the experimental group and the control group:
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| − | :Define $f(x)$ by this rule: $f(x) = x^2$ for $x ≠ 2$; $f(x) = 0$ for $x = 2$
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| − | :Prove using the definition of limit that $\displaystyle \lim_{x \to 2} f(x) = 4$.
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| − | : Control Group Experimental Group
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| − | : (68 students) (68 students)
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| − | :Did not attempt 22 4
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| − | :Standard arguments:
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| − | : Satisfactory proof 2 14
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| − | : Correct statement, faulty proof 15 14
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| − | : Incorrect arguments 29 23
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| − | :Nonstandard arguments:
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| − | : Satisfactory proof 25
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| − | : Incorrect arguments 2
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| − | The study results summarized the comments of the instructors as follows:
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| − | : The group as a whole responded in a way favorable to the experimental method on every item: the students learned the basic concepts of the calculus more easily, proofs were easier to explain and closer to intuition, and most felt that the students end up with a better understanding of the basic concepts of the calculus.43 <ref>Sullivan, pp. 383-84 cited in Dauben, p. 191</ref>
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| − | ==Notes==
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| − | <references/>
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| − | ==References==
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| − | * Bair, Jacques, et. al., "Is Mathematical History Written by the Victors?" ''Notices of the American Mathematical Society'', (60) No 7, pp. 886-904, URL: http://www.ams.org/notices/201307/rnoti-p886.pdf
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| − | * Dauben, Joseph W., (1985). "Abraham Robinson and Nonstandard Analysis: History, Philosophy, and Foundations of Mathematics," URL: http://www.mcps.umn.edu/philosophy/11_7dauben.pdf
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| − | * Davis, Isaac, (2009). "An Introduction to Nonstandard Analysis," URL: http://www.math.uchicago.edu/~may/VIGRE/VIGRE2009/REUPapers/Davis.pdf
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| − | * Laszczyko, Piotr B., Katz, Mikhail G., Sherry, David, (2012) "Ten Misconceptions from the History of Analysis and their Debunking," URL: http://arxiv.org/pdf/1202.4153.pdf
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| − | * Robinson, Abraham (1965). "On the Theory of Normal Families," ''Acta Philosophica Fennica'' 18:159-84.
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| − | * Sullivan, Kathleen (1976). "The Teaching of Elementary Calculus Using the Nonstandard Analysis Approach," ''American Mathematical Monthly'' (83) pp. 370-75.
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