View source for Recursive game

A [[Stochastic game|stochastic game]] with pay-off at the end of a play (see also [[Dynamic game|Dynamic game]]). Since a recursive game can be endless, it is essential to determine the pay-off of the players in the case of infinite plays. An analysis of any Shapley game can be reduced to an analysis of a certain recursive game, but because of the possibility of infinite plays, research on recursive games is generally more complicated than research on stochastic games. Any zero-sum two-person finite recursive game has a value and both players have stationary <img align="absmiddle" border="0" src="https://www.encyclopediaofmath.org/legacyimages/r/r080/r080270/r0802701.png" />-optimal strategies. H. Everett [[#References|[1]]] has demonstrated a method of finding both the value of the game and of the optimal strategies.

====References====
<table><TR><TD valign="top">[1]</TD> <TD valign="top">  H. Everett,   "Recursive games"  H.W. Kuhn (ed.)  A.W. Tucker (ed.) , ''Contributions to the theory of games'' , '''3''' , Princeton Univ. Press  (1957)  pp. 47–87</TD></TR></table>



====Comments====


====References====
<table><TR><TD valign="top">[a1]</TD> <TD valign="top">  S. Alpern,   "Games with repeated decisions"  ''SIAM J. Control Optim.'' , '''26''' :  2  (1988)  pp. 468–477</TD></TR></table>